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Internal Organization in a Public Theory of the Firm:   
Toward a Coase-Oates Federalism Nexus 
ABSTRACT 
This paper anatomizes how the theory of internal organization of the firm relates to 
that of internal organization of government.  This broad issue is approached by 
narrowing matters down to a specific type of internal organization of government:  
fiscal federalism.  The paper introduces elements for a public theory of the firm by 
theoretically combining organizational and federalist insights – Ronald Coase with 
Wallace Oates.  It shows how there are vertical and horizontal transaction cost 
problems in both the ex ante moment of decentralized public sector organizational 
design and the ex post moment of organizational adaptation.  These problems embed 
normative and positive considerations that previous organizational theories of 
federalism fail to consider, and that earlier theories of federalism to some extent 
acknowledge but fail to develop organizationally.  A subsidiary point that emerges is 
that more effort should be directed to exploring the ex ante moment in explicit 
organizational design terms.  To try to jump start the explorative effort, the paper 
also alludes to one promising set of design principles:  modularity. 
JEL CODES 
H11, H44, H76, L95. 
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Coase-Oates nexus; Comparative institutional analysis; Ex ante and ex post fiscal 
federalism; Intergovernmental transaction costs; Modular near-decomposition. 
 
  
Internal Organization in a Public Theory of the Firm:   
Toward a Coase-Oates Federalism Nexus 
 
The debate about how to distribute fiscal responsibilities within a polity – whether 
locally or centrally – remains topical.  In Italy, for example, the so-called Monti 
technical government (November 16, 2011-April 28, 2013) basically demolished 
any hope of Lombard irredentism of the previous executive (the IV Berlusconi 
Cabinet, May 8, 2008-November 6, 2011) by founding a Ministry for Territorial 
Cohesion.  Concurrently, there are supranational forces imposing national fiscal 
responsibilities:  the various sovereign debt crises of the Euro zone led to the 
“Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union,” also known as the Fiscal Compact, which from January 1, 2013 requires a 
national legal rule whereby budgets of signatory states must always be balanced or in 
surplus.  And, of course, there is the 2016 Brexit and the 2017 Catalan independence 
attempt, and recurring concerns about Scottish independence and Quitaly. 
At the core of the debate, as I see it, is a two-sided issue that relates to distinct 
organizational moments of a fiscal federation, namely the ex ante moment of 
organizational design and the ex post moment of organizational adaptation.  Though 
the two moments are distinct, their common thread is classic:  “that every 
government ought to contain in itself the means of its own preservation.”1  That is to 
say that, like any other organization, government faces costly trade-offs having to do 
with both its raison d'être and survival. 
However, there is little coherent theoretical apparatus to draw upon in order to 
carefully think about the two-sided issue organizationally.  This paper tries to 
remedy the situation by outlining the connection between the basic reasoning 
principles of fiscal federalism, especially in the work of Wallace E. Oates, and those 
found in the work of Ronald H. Coase.  It therefore teases out some first elements 
for a coherent organizational theory of fiscal federalism – for a public theory of the 
firm – mostly by distilling the insights of the two doyens of the fields under 
consideration. 
One of the main contributions that Coase is known for is “The Nature of the 
Firm” (1937).  Few would deny that this contribution single-handedly spawned the 
                                               
1  Federalist Paper No. 59 by Alexander Hamilton, webbed version, original emphasis: 
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa59.htm (last accessed July 6, 2017). 
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field of the theory of the firm, or, more broadly, the modern economics of 
organization (Gibbons and Roberts 2013).  The field gravitates around three main 
questions:   
(1) Why do firms exist? 
(2) What determines firm boundaries? 
(3) How are firms internally organized? 
The main focus of the proposed public theory of the firm is on a variant of the 
third question:  how does the theory of internal organization of the firm relate to 
that of internal organization of government?  The focus on fiscal federalism narrows 
this broad question.  The reason for the focus is straightforward:  the study of the 
internal organization of government – of the horizontal and vertical relationships 
among governments – in terms of the theory of the firm is a recent, important 
development in federalism theory (Oates 2008; Weingast 2014). 
Government, just as a firm, relies on decentralization, the nature and extent of 
which, we shall see, are not transaction-cost free.  More specifically, viewing the 
internal organization of a fiscal federation through a public theory of the firm that 
hinges on a Coase-Oates nexus leads to normative and positive considerations about 
the ex ante and ex post political economy of policy rights allocation in a fiscal 
federation that previous organizational approaches fail to consider, and that earlier 
theories of fiscal federalism to some extent acknowledge but fail to develop 
organizationally.  That is to say that ex ante and ex post organizational moments 
ultimately reflect fixed and variable transaction-cost compromises that must be 
taken into account when considering the political economy of horizontal and 
vertical fiscal intergovernmental relations. 
A subsidiary point that emerges is that the ex ante moment is less explored than 
the ex post.  However, both moments result to be closely connected if one continues 
to reason organizationally, viz. in terms of both transaction costs and property 
rights.  The consequence is that more effort should be dedicated to directly 
examining the ex ante moment in terms of explicit principles of organizational 
design.  To try to jump start the effort, I direct attention to one set of candidate 
principles known as modularity. 
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As far as I could determine, the study of federalism in terms that are analogous 
to those presented in the pages that follow has not been proposed before.2  It falls 
squarely within the tradition of the New Institutional Economics (NIE), which 
studies institutions mainly in terms of their coordinative and incentive aligning role 
(Schotter 1981; E. Ostrom 2007; Bednar 2009).3  An important aspect of the NIE 
consists in considering the economizing properties that different institutions have 
when dealing with socioeconomic problems, such as the internalization of positive 
and negative externalities (Coase 1960).  This aspect can be more generally captured 
by asking at what net cost an institution creates order relative to another (Foss and 
Garzarelli 2007). 
Analytically, it translates into the method of comparative-institutional analysis 
(Williamson 1991; Diermeier and Krehbiel 2003), whose ineluctable principle is 
that the institutions to be compared are always feasible and not ideal ones (Demsetz 
1969; Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012).  For example, one does not compare the 
incentive properties of a feasible private health insurance scheme with the incentive 
properties of textbook's perfectly competitive market.  Rather, one compares the 
alternative incentive properties of different feasible types of private health 
insurance schemes.  The method concerns cost-benefit calculation in real- (or, if you 
prefer, second-best) world scenarios where there are transaction (and other) fixed 
and variable costs that purposive economic action tries to surmount, or, at least, 
decrease (Williamson 1985), and where the observed institutions better manage 
these costs than their (non-observed) alternatives (Gibbons 2005). 
We therefore might say that comparative institutional analysis injects a 
significant dose of realism into economics, and social science more generally, by 
concentrating on the cost-benefit problem-solving attributes that feasible, 
alternative institutions possess (Mäki 1998).  This is a salutary dose that fiscal 
federalism also has been receiving (Hamlin 1991), especially with its recent 
emphasis on the modern economics of organization (Oates 2005).  This paper in an 
                                               
2  Breton and Scott (1978) is close in spirit.  However, its point of entry is fiscal federalism mostly 
for design issues, whereas mine is the economics of organization for a federation's design as well 
as adaptation issues. 
3  Throughout, institutions are assumed to be “systems of established and embedded social rules that 
structure social interactions,” and organizations to be “special institutions that involve (a) criteria 
to establish their boundaries and to distinguish their members from nonmembers, (b) principles 
of sovereignty concerning who is in charge, and (c) chains of command delineating 
responsibilities within the organization” (Hodgson 2006, p. 18).  Thus government is an 
organization in the sense of being a special type of institution. 
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attempt to reinforce the dose by viewing the internal organization of government 
through the lens of a public theory of the firm:  it can be interpreted as an initial step 
for a more coherent theory in the spirit of Vincent Ostrom's (1987, 1991) integrated 
federalism project that distinguishes between constitutional and day-to-day 
government rules (Bish 2013, p. 237).  A project that also more generally connects 
to constitutional political economy (Buchanan 1990; Congleton, Kyriacou, and 
Bacaria 2003), the law and economics of the constitution (Cooter 2000), and 
political decentralization (Treisman 2007). 
COHERENCE IN ANALOGY OF CONTEXTS 
Considering government in terms of the theory of the firm can run up a red flag.  
For it can bring to mind innate differences between firm and government, casting 
doubts on the entire enterprise of a public theory of the firm.  One often emphasized 
difference is the more complicated objective function:  a firm is profit oriented; 
while the nature of government's function really includes multiple, often 
overlapping and more vaguely-defined foci, such as fix roads, improve taxpayers' 
health, and reduce pollution (Wilson 1989). 
Notwithstanding this and other differences, such as selection mechanisms and 
hardness of budgets, what allows the analogy of contexts is that government and 
firm are cut from the same cloth, namely both are composed of rules of behavior 
(Hayek 2013[1973]; Coase and Wang 2012).  This implies that organizational 
problems are endogenous to both (Breton 2000; Dixit 2008).  Simply put, issues of 
credible commitment, decision allocation, knowledge distribution and use, 
monitoring, performance shading, transaction costs, and the like are, mutatis 
mutandis, central organizational challenges for both government and firm. 
At the same time, looking at matters from the reverse perspective, one can 
reasonably argue that a nontrivial slice of the Coasean scientific enterprise, as well 
as its legal subtext, was always concerned with the public sphere.  For example, 
already in the 1930s Coase explored the effects of government ownership of British 
utilities, an exploration that turned out to be very influential for “The Federal 
Communications Commission” (1959) and the derived “Problem of Social Cost” 
(1960).  Moreover, in “The Lighthouse in Economics” (1974) Coase again explores 
comparative institutional efficiencies by considering the public and private supply of 
lighthouse services (Shirley, Wang, and Ménard 2015, pp. 230-233, 236). 
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The ingredient shared by all these Coasean works is that government is in reality 
never absent as concerns defining property rights:  through its ultimate authority, 
government prescribes a set of use rights for each resource (Merril and Smith 
2011).4  The relevance of this shared Coasean ingredient in our context manifests 
through a parallel:  another way to think about the suggested ex ante and ex post 
organizational moments of a federation is in terms of the definition of in rem and of 
ad personam rights.  In the Coasean world where property rights matter and 
transaction costs are positive,5 the ex ante moment can be considered as the 
delineation of property rights in rem, that is, as the fixed costs for an organization in 
setting up protected spheres of “authority” (Alchian 1965) against all (think of the 
constitution); while the ex post moment can be considered as regarding bilateral or 
multilateral identifiable property rights relationships, such as the variable costs tied 
to changes in ownership rights to policy when intergovernmental externality 
internalization is needed (ad personam rights). 
HOW DOES THE THEORY OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE FIRM  
RELATE TO THAT OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT? 
The study of the internal organization of government has a long and distinguished 
tradition in the public economics analysis of federalism, the modern starting point of 
which is, of course, Oates' Fiscal Federalism (1972).  This seminal contribution by 
the late Oates is grounded in the Pigouvian approach found in the equally seminal 
works of Arrow, Musgrave, and Samuelson.  Contributions within this tradition are 
now commonly referred to as First Generation Theory of fiscal federalism (FGT) to 
distinguish them from an emerging body of literature that more explicitly deals with 
organizational aspects, namely the Second Generation Theory of fiscal federalism 
(SGT) (Oates 2011). 
Implicit in the study of fiscal federalism are two archetypal assumptions.  We 
can call the assumptions, as already indicated at the outset, ex ante and ex post.  The 
                                               
4  Somewhat paradoxically, though Coase can be seen as holding a Legal Realist position as regards 
to property that sees government prescription in use of resources, he neither formally defined 
property rights (Hodgson 2015) nor thought it was possible to crisply define the firm (Coase 
1937, p. 392, n. 1). 
5  Allen (2015, p. 382):  the “definition of transaction costs that works is fundamentally related to 
‘economic property rights.’  Namely, transaction costs are the costs of establishing and 
maintaining economic property rights.  …  Following others, economic property rights are defined 
as the ability to freely exercise a choice.” 
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assumptions cut across common concerns of both a-organizational (First 
Generation) and organizational (Second Generation) theories, and for this reason 
we heuristically can think of them as being ‘meta’ in nature.  We begin by quickly 
introducing the gist of the assumptions for the two sets of federalist theories, and 
then theoretically expand on the assumptions from the perspective of a public 
theory of the firm.6 
 
Two archetypal (meta) assumptions in the theory of fiscal federalism 
 
The ex ante assumption concerns the motivation behind why one would 
decentralize the public sector in the first place.  The closest that we have to an 
explicit theoretical answer in the FGT remains Tiebout (1956).  In light of the 
nonexclusive and nonrival nature of a public good, individuals have a tendency to 
not reveal their preferences.  The lack of preference revelation is an externality.  
Given the nature of a public good, the market cannot properly price it, and for this 
reason the market is said to fail.  But if we decentralize the supply of public goods to 
a series of local governments, then individuals will have a propensity to reveal their 
preferences spontaneously by moving to the government that comes closest to 
satisfying their public good demand.  In this way the public sector internalizes the 
externality from lack of preference revelation. 
Thus, to Tiebout we owe the important idea of voting with the feet as an 
institutional alternative to the ballot, that is, consumer mobility substitutes the vote 
when knowledge about preference for public goods is required.  Yet the idea 
materializes only within a given supply-side:  the local governments to which 
individuals with different preferences can freely sort themselves into are present a 
priori.  And this implies, albeit one can identify institutional traits in Tiebout 
(Garzarelli 2004a), that the organizational design problem is exogenous even though 
we have an explicit motivation to decentralize. 
The ex post assumption acknowledges and aligns with the ex ante assumption 
from the Tiebout motivation.  However, it regards, in line with Oates' interests, 
above all studying the policy measures to take when there are interjurisdictional 
externalities in a decentralized public sector that is already in place.  That is to say 
that the analysis shifts to the failure of another kind of decentralized institution:  we 
                                               
6  As will become apparent, the core of the argument is in reverse order of logic (from ex post to ex 
ante), but merely from expository flow. 
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pass from a market failure to a failure of a federal government organization.  Some 
elaboration proves useful. 
All contributions dealing with the ex post assumption have as point of reference 
Oates' Decentralization Theorem.  The Theorem posits that “in the absence of cost-
savings from the centralized provision of a good and of interjurisdictional external 
effects, the level of welfare will always be at least as high (and typically higher) if 
Pareto-efficient levels of consumption of the good are provided in each jurisdiction 
than if any single, uniform level of consumption is maintained across all 
jurisdictions.  In this way the [Theorem] establishes, in the absence of other kinds of 
offsetting benefits from centralized control, a presumption in favor of decentralized 
finance” (Oates 1972, p. 54, original emphasis; see also p. 35). 
It is no exaggeration to say that Oates' entire research program in fiscal 
federalism genuinely concerns studying situations when the Theorem does not hold 
in order to institutionally work out the arrangement of fiscal responsibility within an 
existing decentralized public sector.  Differently put, though fiscal federalism is 
about both normative and positive issues, the Theorem, also by subsequent, 
repeated admission by Oates (e.g., 1999), is ultimately about normative analysis. 
The ex post FGT assumption sees government as composed of at least two levels, 
central and local.  The central government is a benevolent social planner that deals 
with distribution and stabilization, and supplies national public goods (e.g., common 
defense, foreign affairs).  The local governments are benevolent social planners as 
well.  However, they deal, à la Tiebout, with local public good allocation in the 
attempt to more precisely satisfy different dispersed preferences.  But local 
governments (which, like levels of government, must be at least two in number) 
could fail to coordinate in order to correct spillovers among their jurisdictional 
boundaries (adapt different standards, leave economies unexploited, pass conflicting 
laws, etc.).  The central government, however, never fails, saving the day with 
appropriate spillover internalization through coherent, locally targeted policy 
(Inman and Rubinfeld 1997a, pp. 45-8).  It thus corrects for interjurisdictional 
spillovers from local public goods through matching grants (Pigouvian unit 
subsidies); and the greater the extent of the spillovers, the greater the extent of 
direct central intervention through grants (the larger the unit subsidies), and vice 
versa. 
Central government intervention through Pigouvian grants is the normative 
manifestation of the Decentralization Theorem, or, more precisely, of the failure of 
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the Theorem.  It is the ex post assumption operating in practice, meaning that in the 
FGT grants are the policy tools permitting the variation in the extent of 
decentralization within an existing decentralized public sector.  The intuition is that 
centralization increases when the (benevolent) central government intervenes to 
internalize an interjurisdictional externality – the extent of central intervention 
coincides with the amount of the grant transfer. 
The SGT represents the most explicit link with Coase when it comes to 
considering a public theory of the firm.  It is motivated by the a-organizational (and 
benevolent) approach innate in the FGT from the Pigouvian legacy.  Thus, we find 
the drive to employ various insights from theories of economic organization to the 
public sector. 
The SGT has something very specific in mind when it comes to considering the 
public sector organizationally:  incentive alignment between consumer-voter and 
political representative.  Two approaches dominate:  incomplete contract and 
principal-agent. 
The application of contract theory is mostly employed to study the appropriate 
degree of decentralization in a federation in analogy to an optimal delegation 
problem between consumer-voters and elected officials.  The election is the 
equivalent of the contract, which is considered incomplete because consumer-voters 
and government cannot verify community welfare.  In the incomplete contract 
approach, decentralization increases the probability that the vote of a consumer-
voter will decide who wins elections in a given local region, the result of which is an 
increase in accountability.  However, since, unlike centralization, under 
decentralization consumer-voters of one region cannot determine who wins 
elections in, and thus controls, another region, locally elected officials will disregard 
the spillover effects of the supply of public goods on other regions.  In short, 
decentralization fails in the presence of spillovers (Seabright 1996). 
A similar result holds in the principal-agent approach.  Consider, for instance, 
the principal-agent approach known as the common agency model.  Under the 
common agency model, each consumer-voter offers an incomplete contract to one 
political agent, taking as given the contractual relation between other consumer-
voters and the agent.  Under centralization, the agent is the same for all consumer-
voters.  Under decentralization, the agent is the same only for consumer-voters of 
the same local region.  Since each consumer-voter takes the contracts of all other 
consumer-voters as given, each will try to free ride on monitoring the agent.  The 
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higher is the number of consumer-voters who contract with the agent, the higher is 
the probability of free riding since the costs of detection would decrease with the 
number of consumer-voters.  And, since the number of consumer-voters is higher 
under centralization than under decentralization, decentralization exhibits better 
monitoring than centralization.  Hence decentralization improves political 
accountability.  However, since consumer-voters in a given local region are allowed 
to contract with the agent in the relevant region but not with agents of other 
regions, agents will ignore the effect of spillovers to other regions.  This problem is 
absent or mitigated under centralization because there is only one agent with whom 
all consumer-voters contract.  As a result, centralization is, more than 
decentralization, able to internalize spillovers (Tommasi and Weinschelbaum 2007). 
The upshot is straightforward.  Under both the incomplete contract and the 
principal-agent SGT approaches, the choice to centralize or decentralize depends on 
the trade-off between policy coordination (reducing interjurisdictional spillovers) 
under centralization and accountability to local jurisdictions (improved monitoring 
of political behavior) under decentralization.  In different terms, there is an 
organizational design trade-off between ownership rights to policy and rent-seeking 
control. 
Notice how both of these intriguing SGT approaches deal with the ex ante 
assumption, namely with the costs and benefits of decentralization as such.  They do 
not deal with how the arrangement of fiscal responsibility can vary within an 
existing decentralized public sector.  In other words, they do not explicitly consider 
the ex post assumption so dear to Oates.  An assumption that effectively concerns 
the policy side of the trade-off:  the role of intergovernmental grants.  In fact, the 
neglect of the role of grants is at the core of Oates' (2005) sweeping evaluation of 
the SGT and germane theories from public choice (Brennan and Buchanan 1980) 
and political economics (Lockwood 2002; Besley and Coate 2003). 
 
Ex post, intergovernmental grants, and transaction costs 
 
Others, however, have alluded to what can be considered a Coasean role of grants 
before the SGT came to be.  I have in mind Brennan and Pincus (1990), which is 
standard public choice in the sense that it considers the public sector, and 
economics more generally, as about exchange among individual interests rather than 
optimizing.  The exchange angle is what renders the approach congruent with 
Coase's work. 
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Grants are ex post policy tools for adapting to different externalities (e.g., 
horizontal imbalance, uneven local service delivery).  As alluded to above, the grant 
most central to the (failure of the) Decentralization Theorem, and under 
consideration here (though the same basic logic applies to all types of grants), is the 
one for the internalization of interjurisdictional externalities:  a Pigouvian unit 
subsidy or, if you prefer, a cost-matching formula.  The idea is that the central 
government will match each dollar spent by the local government on a particular 
public good or service that generates an interjurisdictional externality (a bridge built 
by one province but connecting two, meningitis vaccination sponsored by one 
region but open to all, natural resource exploration by one state damaging the 
environment of another, etc.) with a specific sum of money.  For example, the 
central government could match each dollar spent by the local government with a 
dollar. 
There is quite a lot of what Coase calls “blackboard economics” in this normative 
Pigouvian reasoning. “All the information needed is assumed to be available and the 
teacher plays all the parts.”  The teacher “fixes prices, imposes taxes, and distributes 
subsidies (on the blackboard) to promote the general welfare.  But there is no 
counterpart to the teacher within the economic system.  There is no one who is 
entrusted with the task that is performed on the blackboard.”  The principal reason 
is that the relevant private- and public-sector knowledge about how to promote 
welfare is dispersed.  There “is no single entity within the government which 
regulates economic activity in detail, carefully adjusting what is done in one place to 
accord with what is done elsewhere.  In real life we have many different firms and 
government agencies, each with its own interests, policies and powers” (Coase 1988, 
p. 19). 
This is a problem that Oates – himself a pioneer of normative Pigouvian 
reasoning in fiscal federalism – eventually admitted to.7  The idealism of blackboard 
                                               
7  I first interacted in person with Oates in 2002 in Pavia and Rome, Italy, and on several other 
occasions during the following years in Rome (where Wally used to travel regularly) and once in 
New Orleans, US.  I first exposed Wally to the SGT in 2002, which eventually culminated in Oates 
(2005), while, at the same time, Wally persuaded me to revise a typescript (basically some old 
notes later collected as Garzarelli 2004b) about the SGT that ultimately became two papers 
(Garzarelli 2004a, 2006).  Wally always emphasized in these interactions that fiscal federalism, 
unlike, e.g., political federalism, is really about the economic dimension of a decentralized public 
sector, namely the coordinative role of grants as fiscal institutions – basically the ex post 
assumption.  While I think that I managed to raise Wally's awareness about the knowledge 
problems innate in FGT reasoning, I also think that I was less successful in convincing Wally 
about at least questioning more often the benevolence assumption of government.  See also 
Garzarelli and Limam (2003). 
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economics manifests most clearly when one considers the preference revelation 
problem in relation to intergovernmental grants, that is, the ex ante assumption in 
relation to the ex post one.  There  
are some quite strong assumptions made … that don't seem fully consistent 
with one another.  We assume that the central government knows the 
preferences of individuals for national public goods, but not for local public 
goods.  This seems a strange dichotomy.  One might justify it on the grounds 
that acquiring information on national public goods is worth the cost to 
central authorities, while … the value of such information on local public 
goods is not worth its cost of acquisition.  Alternatively and less formally, 
we might simply presume that central government information is imperfect 
for all public goods, but that central provision of truly national public goods 
is likely to produce a better outcome than one in which local jurisdictions 
ignore the benefits that their outputs confer on those in other jurisdictions.  
Pushing this point further, if central government has little knowledge of 
local preferences, how can it determine the correct level for Pigouvian 
subsidies for local outputs that generate interjurisdictional spillover 
benefits?  The measurement of the spillover benefits themselves requires 
local information on the valuation of the benefits.  Again, one might argue, I 
suppose, that the somewhat imperfect subsidies are likely to produce an 
outcome that is typically better than one in which the spillover benefits are 
ignored entirely.  But there clearly are some basic information problems 
here (Oates 2005, p. 359). 
One way to succinctly restate Oates' observations along Coasean lines is to say that 
vertical transaction costs – those case-by-case knowledge costs attached to the 
intergovernmental transfer of (ad personam) policy rights for externality 
internalization – matter for policymaking.8 
The useful Brennan-Pincus connection here is that a grant should be considered 
in institutional terms:  as a quid pro quo between levels of government rather than as 
a windfall Pigouvian spending formula.  To express it slightly differently, a grant is a 
fiscal agreement that is the outcome of complex intergovernmental negotiations, not 
an Athena-like output that springs full-blown from the head of (central government) 
Zeus.  And if a grant is a manifestation of exchange, then it is solving a knowledge 
problem innate in the vertical structure of the public sector as well:  the grant 
communicates grantor preferences about spending decisions to grantee.  The 
backdrop is that bureaucrats and politicians operate in a public sector where 
                                               
8  A point about the complexity of policy design earlier recognized by the literature in general, 
though also not explicitly couched in transaction cost terms but in terms of Mirrlees-Vickrey 
imperfect information (Boadway 1997). 
  
 12 
reputation effects on political promises glue together intertemporal exchange 
relations tied to individual career ambitions.  The incentive to fulfill grant 
expectations is then self-interest – to stay in good terms with political and 
bureaucratic colleagues for reasons of personal career ambition, re-election, keep a 
committee seat, etc. (Garzarelli and Keeton 2017). 
The Coasean prism consequently suggests that we are in the presence of a 
transaction between levels of government:  the intergovernmental transaction 
exchanges property rights to policy based on promises from “mutually dependent 
interests” (Commons 1932-1933, p. 4).  The fact that the mutually dependent 
interests ultimately embedded in the grant are effectively parochial, means that ex 
post organizational adaptation is often a residual:  it is the result of individual 
political and bureaucratic incentives that often have little to do with the explicit 
objective of government survival for reasons of the public good.  However, my 
stance on the matter is positive, not normative:  survival tied to extra-economic 
incentives is innate in the nature of the organizational beast (Weingast and Marshall 
1988). 
The implication is that the vertical transaction for the transfer of property rights 
to policy through the grant is more costly for reasons of “negotiation” than for 
reasons of “enforcement” (Cheung 1969; Allen 1991).  The extra-economic 
incentives generate “security of expectations” (Commons 1932-1933, p. 4), 
rendering the grant – the institution for adaptation to contingencies – an implicit 
contract:  it is not strategically rewarding to deviate from the terms of the contract 
in that the context of the game played is political, and the political game is seldom 
one shot (Oates 2008).9  That is to say that a grant represents an ad personam 
institution for the exchange of economic property rights to policy.  This logic leads 
us to suggest that (variable) intergovernmental transaction costs tied to rights to 
policy have more of a net impact for their negotiation (or coordination) facet than 
for their enforcement (or incentive) facet. 
A contract in Coase (1937) is an ad personam compromise for adaptation to 
contingencies as well, and the more a contract is incomplete, the more likely is a 
firm to adapt.  In a firm, “the service which is being provided is expressed in general 
                                               
9  This is not to mean that incentives are always aligned.  For example, when in Australia a grantee 
(a public university) failed to take the preferences of the grantor (the government) into account, 
the result was punishment through a cut in grant funding (Brennan and Pincus 1990, p. 130).  
However, since it is not strategically rewarding to not fulfill grantor expectations, on balance I 
would consider misalignment to be mostly an exception (Garzarelli and Keeton 2007). 
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terms, the exact details being left until a later date.  All that is stated in the contract 
is the limits to what the persons supplying the commodity or service is expected to 
do.  The details of what the supplier is expected to do is not stated in the contract 
but is decided later by the purchaser.”  Therefore, a firm internalizes “the direction 
of resources” in the effort to also capitalize on, rather than just to obviate, 
contingencies (Coase 1937, p. 392). 
In a public theory of the firm, this Coasean view to organizational adaptation 
boils down to the following proposition about internal organization.  Just like the 
extent of firm decentralization is a dependent variable of the extent of contractual 
incompleteness, so the extent of government decentralization is a dependent 
variable of grant incompleteness.  By grant incompleteness I mean that a grant that 
is less conditional – a grant that has fewer strings attached – is more incomplete 
(Garzarelli 2006).  Ex post this entails that, ceteris paribus, public sector adaptation 
is not about going back and forth between centralization and decentralization as 
such, but concerns the amount of decentralization as well.  That is to say that public 
sector decentralization is not an all-or-none phenomenon:  for adaptive reasons, the 
extent of public sector decentralization can vary in any point in time as a result of 
how conditional a grant is (Garzarelli and Holian 2014). 
Notice how in this case the incomplete contract – the grant – is not about ex ante 
organizational incentives between consumer-voter and political agent as in the 
existing SGT literature.  Rather, it is about agents who ex post transact at different 
levels of government for their own public choice survival, and, in the process, 
residually generate, at a cost, policy coordination. 
At the same time, there can be ex post vertical transaction costs that are bottom-
up.  These costs refer to grants from local to central government.  Think of the 
European Union's budget that originates from grants from member states.  Similarly, 
there also can be ex post horizontal transaction costs, which concern the 
internalization of externalities through grants from governments on the same level 
(Boadway and Keen 1996).  Though acknowledged, these bottom-up and horizontal 
transaction costs are not in a strict sense explored by Oates' original approach nor 
by Oates' subsequent observations about the limitations of the SGT. 
No matter their nature (vertical or horizontal) or vertical direction (top-down or 
bottom-up), however, the uniting thread of these transaction costs is that they all 
ultimately refer to the ex post moment.  That is to say that within grant 
incompleteness there also lie transactions and their variable costs:  the phase of 
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organizational “adaptive efficiency” (North 1990, p. 80) to different problems when 
a federation is already in place.  But the public sector, as we previously learned 
especially from the SGT, is also to be explored in terms of ex ante organizational 
design, which is also not a transaction-cost free lunch. 
 
Ex ante, public sector organizational design, and transaction costs 
 
The ex ante moment can be likened to what fiscal federalism calls the assignment 
problem, which studies what level of government is responsible for what duty.  We 
can think of this first moment as the economics of organization equivalent of 
constitutional engineering or design (Sartori 1994; Ginsburg 2012). 
In the FGT, the ex ante solution to the assignment problem is straightforward 
Pigouvian:  it is solved by default in terms of the three functions of allocation, 
distribution, and stabilization.  Thus, the typical solution is that local governments 
should deal with allocation and central government with distribution and 
stabilization.  The reason for this division of labor is equally straightforward:  local 
government should allocate public goods in light of its grater proximity to the 
consumer-voter.  This default solution residually implies, as pointed out earlier, that 
the central government internalizes externalities between lower levels of 
government. 
The SGT motivation for ex ante decentralization, we saw, is about improving 
accountability tied to political delegation.  Indeed, the notion that decentralization 
should be favored to improve political accountability is the closest statement that 
the SGT has to a decentralization theorem.  But the SGT stops short of proposing 
how to structure the internal organization of government in order to achieve this 
accountability.  And yet, it normatively aligns – by default – with the Pigouvian view 
when there are externalities.  Namely, the spirit is that local governments fail in the 
presence of spillovers because the (horizontal) transaction costs for autonomously 
coordinating the externality internalization are always too high (among others, 
Inman and Rubinfeld 1997a, pp. 48-50; Lockwood 2002, p. 319); albeit there is the 
qualification that the centralization-decentralization trade-off hinges on externality 
size and not just on externality as such (Besley and Coate 2003). 
At the same time, there is no indication that the solution of centralized 
externality internalization is necessarily less costly, to wit that vertical transaction 
costs of internalization are lower than horizontal ones.  Indeed, there is no a priori 
reason as to why this should be so (Breton and Scott 1978; Inman and Rubinfeld 
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1997b; Luelfesmann, Kessler, and Myers 2015).  This normative alignment by 
default is therefore rather puzzling, not in the least because the SGT is predicated on 
the objective to provide a theory of decentralized public sector organizational 
design, and not just a motivation of it (Qian and Weingast 1997). 
Essentially, the SGT (like the FGT) solves the ex ante organizational puzzle of 
vertically and horizontally identifying what government should be assigned to what 
function by difference rather than endogenously.  This reasoning brings to mind 
blackboard economics, because there is no comparative-institutional explanation 
about when transaction costs to perform a function are too high and when they are 
not.10  The question of a theory of decentralized public-sector design is consequently 
left open.  In terms of our proposed public theory of the firm, the answer to the 
question hinges on how internal organization of government should be structured in 
order to deal with the problem of efficient externality internalization.  This means 
that we face a fixed-cost issue of setting-up in rem rights over policy to different 
levels of government. 
What organizational design principles can we draw upon to consider this 
complex ex ante issue?  A promising set of principles is modularity (Simon 1962; 
Alexander 1964).  The premise of modularity is simple.  It is easier to tackle a 
complex issue by decomposing it into smaller parts, namely modules.  Recall how 
we all learned to solve mathematical problems by breaking them down into more 
manageable sub-problems. 
Modularity shows how when dealing with complexity the minimization of 
interactions among modules is key.  The minimization of interactions can be 
achieved by letting the modules be less directly dependent on one another – by 
letting the modules communicate only seldom, allowing within-module 
communication more often.  This particular process of modularization is known as 
near-decomposition (Simon and Ando 1961). 
As an organizational design, a nearly-decomposed modularization stands 
between full decomposition and integrality (or non-decomposition).  A fully 
decomposed system is not so interesting for our purposes.  It refers to a 
                                               
10  More precisely, there is no so such explanation that in addition to collective decision rules also 
considers organizational design.  See for example Inman and Rubinfeld (1997a, pp. 48-53) and 
Cooter and Siegel (2010) on unanimity versus majoritarian voting or even Casella (1999) on 
tradeable deficit permits.  My point is that we need to consider the design of organization as much 
as that of decision rules:  the relationships between the two are not trivial and can be 
complementary as well as substitutable.  In brief, both Coase (1937) and Coase (1960) matter. 
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modularization where there are zero inter-modular interactions since the modules 
do not share a common end – each module pursues its own idiosyncratic objective 
without a link to an overarching organizational one.  The market comes to mind 
(Hayek 1945).  An integral system is at the polar extreme:  every module must 
communicate with all other modules at all times, implying that each part of the 
system is completely dependent on every other part in order for the system to 
pursue its objective.  It is obvious here that the magnitude of the transaction costs 
would be formidable given the complete graph nature of the design.  To borrow 
Tullock's metaphor (1969, p. 23) from a related discussion on federalism and local 
government scope, it is easier for restaurant patrons to mix and match menu options 
from a short menu rather than to face the choice of selecting from a much longer 
menu that already contains all possible mix and match options.  The lesson is that 
transaction costs from coordination and communication rise faster than benefits 
when the addition of more organizational elements (divisions, individuals) also 
requires more integration among all elements.11  This leaves us with near-
decomposition.  Near-decomposition, like integrality, is not perfect.  However, the 
ex ante costs of its decentralized design are often worth paying in order to minimize 
the ex post costs of organizational adaptation (Langlois and Garzarelli 2008).  How 
can this result be achieved? 
A near-decomposition rests on two broad sets of design principles:  visible 
design rules and hidden design parameters (or hidden information).  Visible design 
rules establish modules and their purpose (an architecture), how the modules 
interact (an interface), and the relative fit and efficiency properties of a module 
relative to the organization as a whole as well as to other modules (standards).  The 
hidden design parameters instead refer to the inner structure of a module that, to 
avoid too many unmanageable interactions, should not be shared among modules.  
The hidden design parameters should not only manage the inner workings of a 
module.  They should concurrently be in harmony with the overall organizational 
objective, something that is accomplished through a well-functioning interface 
(Baldwin and Clark 2000). 
It is rewarding to establish and maintain (and usually to adjust when necessary) 
ex ante rights to exclude through the design principles of modular near-
                                               
11  A challenge famously faced by software engineers before modularity in programming, and that 
became known as Brook's Law. 
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decomposition – i.e., in rem shielded domains of authority – because it is not 
economical to spell out ad personam rights every time a transaction is needed 
(Coase 1937).  Or, in Smith's (2012) vivid image, near-decomposition, like an 
economy's structure of property rights more generally (Coase 1960), is the fixed 
transaction cost shortcut that is produced in order to replace those variable 
transaction costs that emerge when trying to map out all pairwise contractual 
exchange relations.  The establishment of standards (e.g., a common accounting 
system for tracking and comparing health-care expenditure across federated states) 
and the exchange of commitments subject to punishment (e.g., the Stability and 
Growth Pact of the EU) can be considered two illustrations of this shortcut. 
Take note that this is not necessarily tantamount to asserting that, in a good 
decentralized design, externalities are minimized, reduced in size or eliminated.  A 
near-decomposition is a social artifact.  As such, it is fallible like its designers – its 
property rights, no matter how well-defined, cannot be perfect.12  Inter-modular 
externalities will still crop up; and this is another instance to take to comparative-
institutional analysis to see what module(s) should perform the internalization (and 
how) (Langlois 2002). 
This is a notion that the economics of organization has long understood when 
answering the second of the three Coasean questions – namely that the 
organization-market boundary, even in public contexts (Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny 
1997; Nelson 1997; Levin and Tadelis 2010), is determined according to the 
minimization of internality cost.  In terms of our main concern, this reasoning 
suggests that when designing an internal organization of government what we are in 
effect doing is designing two sets of boundaries:  those between market and public 
sector organization in the broadest sense, and those among the modules that 
compose the internal organization.  The first set of boundaries is the one that we are 
most familiar with:  rules of behavior with a common end (organization) replace 
more abstract ones (market) (Hayek 2013[1973]).  The second set is the 
quintessence of near-decomposition.  It refers to the demarcation line among 
modules, which hinge on communication as needed, rather than at all times; said 
another way, near-decomposition minimizes the costs of externality internalization 
when the costliest transactions are left to the modules.  This is achieved through 
common interfaces, which are key to keeping a nearly-decomposable system 
                                               
12  And even if they were perfect, it does not follow that transaction costs are zero (Allen 2015). 
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together (e.g., public law).  A well-functioning “common interface enables, but also 
governs and disciplines … communication” among modules without letting the 
system drift into full decomposition (Langlois and Garzarelli 2008, p. 128). 
A nearly-decomposed modular system is therefore a nested hierarchy.  In terms 
of structure, it brings to mind a Russian matryoshka, a hollow wooden doll 
containing a hierarchy of an arbitrary number of similarly-shaped dolls that decrease 
in size and that are all stacked one inside the other.  In terms of function, it has the 
characteristic that interactions among modules are less frequent than those within 
modules. 
At this juncture, the parallelisms between the principles of modular near-
decomposition and of federalism should be intuitively evident.  An architecture 
refers to the federated states and their policy responsibilities (modules), an 
interface to the (public) rules of interstate governance (e.g., constitution and other 
comparable legislation, inter-regional law, treaties in supranational federations), and 
the standards to performance (ceteris paribus, the supply of the same public service 
should be of comparable quality across states, interjurisdictional externality 
internalization should have the same cost no matter what federated state performs 
it, etc.).13 
What a well-crafted, near-decomposed internal organization of government can 
do is incentivize a federated state to more carefully plan the use of its resources and 
assets.  This would lead to an improved use of local knowledge and aid the division 
of labor among and within federated states (Tullock 1969, p. 28).  Further, when the 
Decentralization Theorem fails one would not automatically resort to central 
intervention, but actually consider the (variable) vertical transaction costs of central 
intervention against the (variable) horizontal transaction costs of autonomous 
externality internalization. 
Clearly, modular near-decomposition is no easy matter, and as such it is subject 
to trial-and-error.  For example, when experimenting with configurations, one 
should take into account how module size and not just module number can impact 
overall efficiency (Shrestha and Feiock 2011).  Moreover, my sense is that public 
contexts, with their greater susceptibility to rent-seeking captures, pressures and 
tussles than private ones, arguably exhibit higher probabilities of design failure.  In 
                                               
13  For a full-blown articulation of the parallelisms that also models cost-benefit implications of 
feasible, alternative public-sector near-decompositions, see Garzarelli and Sitoe (2018). 
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this sense, a clear illustration of a badly-crafted near-decomposition from too many 
political interests is so-called Italian-style federalism (da Empoli 2014).  Ultimately, 
the type of modularization that a system should undergo is an empirical issue (Smith 
2012).  Luckily, the off-the-shelf principles of modular near-decomposition are 
themselves a modular system that can be tailored to existing institutional settings. 
TOWARD A COASE-OATES FEDERALISM NEXUS 
We have teased out the following logic from received theories of fiscal federalism. 
(1) The market always fails when it comes to public good supply, that is, a 
public good always generates at least an externality. 
(2) The normative implication is that government ought to supply public 
goods. 
(3) However, government can also fail in its supply of public goods when 
allocation only stems centrally.  As a result, correction of central 
government failure is achieved by letting local governments deal with 
public good supply, that is, through fiscal decentralization of 
government. 
(4) Still, after public decentralization is in place – namely, once we have 
at least two levels of government and at least two local governments 
with some degree of fiscal autonomy – local governments fail to 
autonomously coordinate to internalize all local externalities they are 
involved in, calling for central government intervention through 
grants. 
(4´) The reason why there is failure of autonomous externality 
internalization in (4) is imputed, even if not always explicitly, to 
excessive transaction costs, but the institutional reason behind these 
transaction costs is never genuinely explained.  Recall the blackboard 
economics image. 
Received theories of fiscal federalism underscore that to the three feasible 
institutions studied – market, central government, and local government – can 
correspond also three institutional failures.  I do not dispute that the three 
institutions in question can fail.  What is needed, however, is a more precise account 
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of the conditions under which they fail:  an assessment of the relative costs and 
benefits of using one institution over another.  This paper argues, maybe in a too 
desultory fashion, that we could benefit from a more careful application of the basic 
principles that underlie the comparative institutional calculus, from both an 
organizational design and an organizational adaptation perspective.  In particular, it 
adds the following propositions to the logic of received theories. 
(5) Intergovernmental transaction costs vary in magnitude; in other 
words, they are not necessarily always excessive. 
(5´) Moreover, transaction costs vary in direction (horizontal; top-down 
and bottom-up vertical) and type (fixed; variable). 
(6) The nature of the decentralized organization of the public sector – the 
in rem structure of property rights to policy – is not a matter of 
indifference:  alternative ex ante feasible modular near-
decompositions differently affect the magnitude of variable 
transaction costs ex post.  This is federalism in its organizational 
design guise. 
(7) Ex post coordination in a decentralized public sector – the ad 
personam allocation of property rights to policy – depends on the 
magnitude of variable transaction costs.  This is federalism in its 
organizational adaptation guise. 
(7´) The horizontal buy (or price control) choice through grants 
(alternatively taxes) should be considered alongside the vertical one 
when assessing costs and benefits of coordination. 
The substantive implication is that the demarcation line among the three 
functions of allocation, distribution, and stabilization would be endogenously 
determined.  Except perhaps for a handful of more strategic policy rights that one 
could assign centrally – monetary policy and sovereign transactions come to mind14 
– assignment in general (i.e., not just tied to externality internalization) would be 
the output of an institutional comparative efficiency criterion.  So differentiation 
among functions would be less stringent, more fluid.  After all, the assignment of 
                                               
14  Sovereign transactions are those public-sector transactions that ought to be performed centrally 
rather than locally not necessarily for cost-saving or efficiency reasons, but for reasons of security 
(e.g., foreign affairs, foreign intelligence, military) (Wilson 1989; Williamson 1999). 
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duties already does not always directly translate into a crisp central-local and local-
local government differentiation (e.g., tax and expenditure decisions designed to 
achieve optimal allocation of resources affect income redistribution and the level of 
employment and price stability). 
In my view, the organizational economics of fiscal federalism remains an open 
research agenda.  The incorporation of transaction costs and property rights into the 
analysis of the internal organization of federalism – the Coase-Oates federalism nexus 
– represents a first module to building a public theory of the firm. 
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